The United States military does not have a technology problem. It has a response-speed problem. Aaron Brynildson, an Air and Space Law Instructor at Ole Miss, argues that its a bureaucracy problem.
That does not mean the U.S. lacks innovation, talent, engineering strength, or industrial capability. Quite the opposite. The United States still has the strongest combination of military expertise, private-sector innovation, and industrial potential in the world.
The problem is that modern warfare is changing faster than traditional military systems and the ecosystem that supports them can adapt.
The battlefield is now shaped by drones, electronic warfare, cyber effects, contested spectrum, long-range precision fires, commercial satellite networks, artificial intelligence, attritable platforms, and rapidly evolving communications requirements. The side that can observe, adapt, produce, field, and integrate faster (and cheaper) gains an advantage.
This is the real meaning behind “the speed of war vs. the speed of response.” It is not only about making faster decisions at headquarters and in the field. It is about whether the militaries and organizations, including the Department of War, can pivot quickly enough to meet the evolving needs of the warfighter.
War is evolving faster than legacy processes
Back in 2017, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford warned that “the character of war in the 21st century has changed,” adding that if the U.S. fails to keep pace with the speed of war, it will lose the ability to compete.
That warning has only become more urgent, as recent global conflicts have showcased.
Modern conflict is no longer defined only by who has the most advanced platform. It is increasingly defined by who can adapt the fastest. A drone tactic that works this month may be countered next month. A communications path that is reliable during training may be jammed, degraded, or denied in conflict. A system that takes years to field may arrive after the operational problem has already changed.
This is one of the clearest lessons from the war in Ukraine. The war has become a proving ground for rapid adaptation, mass production, electronic warfare, commercial technology, and battlefield-driven iteration. CSIS described the Russia-Ukraine war as a “real-world laboratory” for testing new military technologies and operational adaptations.
That lesson should influence how the United States approaches modernization.
The question is no longer only, “Can we build the most advanced system?” The question is, “Can we get the right capability to the warfighter fast enough, in enough quantity, and with enough flexibility to remain useful as the fight changes?”
The new standard is speed, scale, and adaptability
The Department of War has already recognized this shift. In its acquisition transformation strategy, the DoW states that it must “field technology and modernize systems at a rate that outpaces our adversaries.”
Achieving this will require more than new policy language. It requires shorter development cycles, faster contracting paths, clearer requirements, and a greater willingness to accept measured risk. It also requires recognizing that the traditional acquisition model cannot solve every operational problem.
Certain strategic platforms will always demand years of engineering, testing, and integration. But that approach cannot be applied to every radio, software application, network component, sensor, battery, compute platform, or tactical communications tool.
Modern war combines advanced technology with attrition. Systems must be produced, replaced, upgraded, and reconfigured continuously.
Tactical communications, command and control software, network hardware, and cyber tools are no different. A force cannot adapt quickly if the systems connecting it are slow to procure, slow to configure, difficult to integrate, or locked into closed ecosystems.
Cost is a massive strategic consideration
It’s worth mentioning that speed and adaptability are only part of the equation. Cost has become just as critical.
Modern conflicts are increasingly defined by asymmetric economics. Adversaries are finding ways to use low-cost systems to challenge or defeat far more expensive capabilities. This has especially been demonstrated in the war in Iran, where Iranian forces have continued to use low-cost drones (sometimes costing as little $35,000) to combat U.S. missiles that are between 10 and 100 times more expensive.
This dynamic creates a strategic imbalance. Even when the United States or its partners successfully defend against an attack, the cost exchange ratio can favor the adversary. Over time, that imbalance can strain resources, limit operational flexibility, and reduce the ability to sustain prolonged engagements.
This makes affordability a core requirement. Systems must be effective, scalable, and sustainable—able to be produced, replaced, and deployed without excessive cost. The advantage will go to the force that combines speed, adaptability, and cost efficiency.
Industry has to be part of the response
Much of today’s technological progress comes from the commercial sector. Defense modernization must account for that reality.
CNAS noted that the U.S. defense share of global research and development fell from about 36 percent in 1960 to just 3.1 percent in 2019. The same report stated that non-defense firms now lead progress in 11 of the Pentagon’s 14 designated critical technology areas.
That does not mean military-specific engineering is less important. It means the DoW cannot afford to treat commercial innovation as an afterthought.
The next generation of warfighting capability will depend on stronger partnerships between government, traditional defense companies, nontraditional vendors, software firms, manufacturers, integrators, and operational users.
The military understands the mission. Industry can contribute engineering expertise, software development, production agility, and technologies already advancing in the commercial market. The challenge is creating a faster path between an operational problem and the organizations capable of solving it.
Government must provide clearer demand signals and more accessible contracting pathways. Industry must listen closely to operational users and build around real mission requirements. Speed without operational relevance does not help the warfighter.
Tactical communications that move at the speed of war
Tactical communications connect commanders, sensors, operators, vehicles, aircraft, dismounted personnel, and coalition partners. When those connections fail, information slows down, coordination breaks apart, and the force loses tempo.
Communications architectures can change as quickly as the mission does. A joint operation may involve legacy radios, modern IP networks, SATCOM, coalition communication system, ATAK endpoints, and more. The architecture must flex around the mission, not force the mission to conform to the architecture.
This is why one of REDCOM’s core tenets is interoperability. The point is not to force the customer into one proprietary ecosystem, it’s to help teams connect across the systems they already have and the systems they will need next.
The United States can move faster
The gap between the speed of war and the speed of response is serious, but it is not permanent. The United States still has the engineering talent, industrial capacity, military expertise, private-sector innovation, and allied relationships required to meet the challenge. The pieces already exist. They need to work together more effectively.
Acquisition models must continue moving toward faster fielding and more frequent technology refreshes. Industry must build systems that are practical, scalable, interoperable, and ready for difficult operational conditions. Requirements should be shaped by continuous feedback from the people using the equipment.
War will not slow down to accommodate outdated processes. The response must get faster.
Continuing the conversation with NDIA
REDCOM will explore this topic further during an upcoming NDIA webinar featuring Patrick Vaughn and Edwin Carrasquillo. The discussion will examine the growing gap between how quickly modern conflict is evolving and how prepared forces are to respond, with a focus on interoperability, tactical communications, joint and coalition operations, and what industry can do to help the Department of War move faster.
Register for “The Speed of War vs. the Speed of Response” on July 22, 2026.
The mission cannot wait for technology to catch up. The systems that support the warfighter must be built, adapted, and delivered at the speed of the fight.
